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Knowledge, Understanding and
Epistemic Value
DUNCAN PRITCHARD
1.
It is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that knowledge is distinc-
tively valuable. If this were not so, then it would be simplymysterious
why knowledge has been the focus of so much of epistemological
theorising, rather than some other epistemic standing like justiﬁed
true belief. Given this fact, however, it is obviously important to a
theory of knowledge that it is able to offer a good explanation of
why we have this intuition. Indeed, some, such as Jonathan
Kvanvig (2003) and Timothy Williamson (2000), have argued that
if a theory of knowledge does not make it transparent why knowledge
is distinctively valuable then this is a decisive strike against it. We do
not need to go this far, however. What is important is just that a
theory of knowledge is able to adequately account for this intuition.
One very direct way of accounting for the intuition would be to
offer a theory of knowledge which demonstrated why knowledge is
distinctively valuable in the manner that we intuitively suppose.
Wewill call proposals of this sort validatory, since they aim to validate
our pre-theoretical intuitions about the value of knowledge. Positions
of this sort have been offered by, for example, Linda Zagzebski (1996;
1999; 2003) and John Greco (2002; 2007; forthcominga), and we will
consider one such proposal in this respect below.
Notice, however, that one does not need to validate an intuition in
order to account for it. One could instead put forward a theory of
knowledge on which knowledge is not distinctively valuable, but
which could explain why we might pre-theoretically think that
knowledge is distinctively valuable. We will call proposals of this
sort revisionist, since they revise our pre-theoretical intuitions about
the value of knowledge. Mark Kaplan (1985), for example, famously
argued that the moral of the post-Gettier literature was that it is not
knowledge which is distinctively valuable but rather justiﬁed true
belief – knowledge being justiﬁed true belief plus an anti-Gettier
condition – but that since justiﬁed true belief usually sufﬁced for
knowledge, the mistake was entirely natural. A second proposal
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along these lines, which wewill look at inmore detail below, is offered
by Kvanvig (2003) who argues that it is understanding, not knowl-
edge, which is distinctively valuable, where understanding is an
epistemic standing that is closely related to knowledge.
Of course, a ﬁnal option in this regard is to simply argue that our
intuitions on this score are simply wrong on closer analysis. That
is, that there is no distinctively valuable epistemic standing. We
will call proposals of this sort fatalist, since they do not hold out
any hope of doing justice to our pre-theoretic intuitions about the
value of knowledge in the way that revisionist proposals do. If you
think, like Crispin Sartwell (1992), that knowledge just is true
belief then you will probably be sympathetic to a view of this sort.1
Clearly, a fatalist proposal will be by its nature an uncomfortable
position to defend. In this paper I will be exploring a version of vali-
dationism and a version of revisionism, and along the way trying to
avoid fatalism. As we will see, although both of the proposals that
we will be looking at are problematic, a third position will emerge
from our discussion which can at least offer us a plausible revisionist
account.2
2.
The ﬁrst response that we will be looking at is a form of validationism
and it arises out of a certain virtue-theoretic account of knowledge.
Modest virtue epistemological theories – of the sort defended by,
for example, Greco (1999; 2000) in his early work – demand that a
necessary condition of knowledge is that the agent forms her true
belief via the stable and reliable cognitive abilities that make up her
cognitive character. There is obviously a lot to be said about how a
proposal of this sort is to be construed. One might build quite a lot
into the notion of a cognitive ability, for example, or into the
notion of a cognitive character. Depending on how one developed
these notions the view could thus be more or less restrictive as an
account of knowledge. We can set these issues to one side, however,
since, as we will see, what is important for our purposes is the struc-
ture of a proposal of this sort. The rationale for adding this require-
ment to a theory of knowledge is that what we primarily want from
1 S. Stich 1990 is also often credited with advancing a form of fatalism
of this sort about the value of knowledge.
2 For more on the problem of accounting for epistemic value, see
Pritchard (2007b; cf. Pritchard 2007d).
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such a theory is an account of how we are being suitably sensitive to
the facts when we know, and this makes cognitive abilities central to
knowledge.
To see this point, consider the following example. Imagine that
someone is in a room and forming her beliefs about the temperature
of the room by looking at a thermometer on the wall. Suppose further
that this is indeed a highly reliable way of forming beliefs in this
regard, in the sense that every time she forms her belief in this way
the belief so formed is true. Here’s the twist. The thermometer is,
unbeknownst to the agent, broken, and is ﬂuctuating within a given
range. This does not undermine the reliability of the agent’s
beliefs, however, for the simple reason that there is someone
hidden in the room who is altering the thermostat in such a way as
to ensure that every time the agent forms a belief about the tempera-
ture of the room by looking at the thermostat, her belief is true.
The agent in this case clearly does not have knowledge. Moreover,
the right diagnosis of why the agent doesn’t know is that the
reliability of her belief-forming processes does not reﬂect any cogni-
tive ability on her part. It is not as if she is being sensitive to the facts
in the way that she is forming her beliefs, but rather that the facts are
being sensitive to her beliefs – i.e. the direction of ﬁt is all wrong.
Virtue epistemology offers a straightforward way of dealing with
cases like this, since the fact that the agent is not forming her true
belief via her cognitive abilities sufﬁces to entail, on this view, that
she lacks knowledge.
Crucially, though, standard forms of virtue epistemology do not
regard this appeal to cognitive ability as sufﬁcing to offer a complete
account of knowledge. This is because of Gettier-style cases, cases in
which something intervenes ‘betwixt belief and fact’.3 Suppose that
our agent is looking into aﬁeld and, using her reliable cognitive abilities,
forms the belief that there is a sheep in the ﬁeld. Suppose further that
this belief is true, but that the agent is not in fact looking at a sheep
but a big hairy dogwhich looks just like a sheep, andwhich is obscuring
from view the sheep that is in the ﬁeld. The agent in this case clearly
lacks knowledge since it is just a matter of luck that her belief is true.4
Nevertheless, she is forming a true belief via the stable and reliable cog-
nitive abilities that make up her cognitive character.
The standard way in which virtue epistemologists deal with
Gettier-style cases is by supplementing the view with an anti-luck
3 I owe this way of putting the kind of luck in play in Gettier-style cases
to P. Unger (1968).
4 This example is due to R. Chisholm 1977: 105.
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condition, like the safety principle. This is the move made until quite
recently byGreco (1999; 2000), for example (though, as wewill see in
amoment, Greco takes a very different line on this issue now).5We do
not need to get into the details of what is involved in a principle like
safety here; what is important is just that such a condition ensures that
the agent could not have easily been wrong, thereby denying knowl-
edge to agents in the Gettier-style cases.
3.
More recent virtue-epistemic proposals have not taken this line,
however, and have instead followed Ernest Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007)
in arguing that if we ‘beef-up’ the ability condition on knowledge
then we can deal with Gettier-style cases without appeal to an
anti-luck condition. Signiﬁcantly for our purposes, such a robust
virtue epistemology is also able, or so the argument goes at any
rate, to account for the distinctive value of knowledge.
Proponents of a robust virtue epistemology of this sort – such as
Zagzebski (e.g. 1995) and, in more recent work, Greco (2002; 2007;
forthcominga; forthcomingb) – argue that where modest virtue
epistemology goes wrong is by simply requiring the conjunction of
cognitive ability and cognitive success (i.e. true belief). So construed,
it is possible for something to come ‘betwixt’ the cognitive ability and
the cognitive success such that the success is ‘gettierized’. However,
we can avoid this situation, they argue, so long as we require not
just the conjunction of cognitive success and cognitive ability,
but in addition demand that the cognitive success be because of
cognitive ability, in the sense that the cognitive ability best explains
the cognitive success.
Consider again the ‘sheep’ Gettier-style case described above and
suppose that we add the ‘because of’ requirement. This certainly
does seem to deal with this example since while the agent’s cognitive
success arises out of her cognitive ability, the cognitive success is not
because of her cognitive ability but rather because of some incidental
fact about the environment (i.e. that there happened to be a sheep
hidden from view behind the big hairy dog).
So it does seem as if this proposal can indeed deal with
Gettier-style cases, and if it can then there is no need to add an
anti-luck condition. Of course, adding this requirement will create
5 For more on safety, see Sosa 1999 and Pritchard 2002; 2005: ch. 6;
2006; 2007a.
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problems in other respects, largely due to the fact that it is a complex
matter offering the right account of the ‘because of’ relation. Indeed,
on the standard view, the right semantics for causal explanation sen-
tences is along contextualist lines, and this would seem to suggest that
a robust virtue epistemology should be allied to a form of attributer
contextualism. Although Greco (e.g. forthcomingb), for one, has
embraced this consequence of his view, this is certainly a surprising
alliance. Still, we needn’t get bogged-down in this issue.6 Let us
take it that we have at least an intuitive sense of how to read these
‘because of’ claims. As wewill see, the issues that we need to consider
in this regard trade on examples where our intuitions are pretty clear-
cut, and thus we ought to be able to ignore these complications
without too much concern.
4.
Themanner in which a proposal of this sort can enable us to deal with
the value problem is because knowledge on this view can plausibly be
regarded as a type of achievement, and achievements in turn are often
thought to be distinctively valuable. Let us consider the notion of an
achievement ﬁrst. Proponents of robust virtue epistemologymaintain
that an achievement is a success that is because of ability. Since
knowledge on their view is to be understood as a cognitive success
that is because of cognitive ability, that makes knowledge a cognitive
achievement.
In order to see that this is a plausible account of achievement,
imagine someone with a bow and arrow selecting a target, ﬁring at
that target, and hitting the target. Suppose, however, that the agent
in question did not have any ability in this regard. Clearly, in such
a case we would not credit the agent with an achievement, since it
was just dumb luck that she was successful. A fortiori, if there is no
ability involved then it cannot be because of such ability that the
agent is successful and so the account of achievement on offer deals
with such cases. Now suppose that we have an agent selecting a
target and skilfully hitting that target with her arrow. Imagine,
however, that the agent’s success is gettierized, in that something
intervenes ‘betwixt’ ability and success. Perhaps, for example, a
freak gust of wind blows the arrow off course, and then a second
gust of wind blows it back on course again. By anyone’s lights,
6 I discuss Greco’s view in this regard in more detail in Pritchard
( forthcomingb).
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although the relevant ability is present, we would not say that this
success is because of the agent’s ability since it is clearly due to the
fortuitous second gust of wind. Moreover, by the same token, we
would not regard this as an achievement on the part of the agent
either, since the success is not properly creditable to her. Again, the
account of achievement under consideration deals with such cases.
Finally, suppose that the agent’s success with the arrow arises out
of the relevant skill and is not gettierized. Surely we would now say
that this success is because of the archer’s ability and, crucially, we
would also treat such a success as an achievement, just as the
account of achievement on offer would predict.
So there is a good case to be made for thinking that achievements
are successes that are because of ability, and if this claim is allowed
then the thesis that knowledge is a type of achievement – a cognitive
achievement – follows immediately on the robust virtue epistemic
view. With this in mind, let us now examine the further claim
that achievements are distinctively – indeed, ﬁnally (i.e. non-
instrumentally) – valuable. To begin with, notice that from a practical
point of view it might not matter whether or not a success is because of
ability, and so constitutes an achievement. If hitting that target wins
you the competition, for example, then it may not matter to you
whether the success in question was, say, gettierized. Nevertheless,
we do value achievements very differently from successes that fall
short of being achievements, as when they are gettierized or are due
to dumb luck rather than ability. In particular, a genuine achievement
seems to be valuable in its own right, independently of any practical
value the success in question might generate. For example, all other
things being equal, we would surely think that it is better to hit the
target because of one’s skill than not, even if there is no instrumental
value from exhibiting an achievement in this case. This seems to
suggest that achievements are ﬁnally valuable.
If this is right, and knowledge is a type of achievement, then it
seems that it will inherit the value of achievements. The reason
why knowledge is distinctively valuable is because knowledge is
an achievement and achievements are distinctively valuable. This
would be a very neat response to the value problem. Moreover,
notice that this would be a case in which one’s theory of knowledge
makes it explicit just why we care about knowledge in the way that
we do. As a validationist response to the problem of epistemic
value, it is thus very attractive.7
7 Interestingly, proponents of this thesis always express the view
as being that knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Given that the
24
Duncan Pritchard
5.
Now there clearly are some prima facie objections to the idea
that achievements are ﬁnally valuable. Some achievements, after
all – such as easy, trivial or wicked achievements – do not seem
to be very valuable at all. Notice, however, that the claim is only
that achievements are ﬁnally valuable qua achievements; the thesis
is not that all achievements are of overall – i.e. all things
considered – value. It is thus entirely open to the defender of this
thesis to maintain that the overall value of lots of achievements is
very low – perhaps negative, if you believe that such a thing is
possible – even while defending the speciﬁc thesis that achievements
are ﬁnally valuable.
Alternatively, the proponent of such a thesis could argue for a
modiﬁed version of the thesis along more holistic lines by saying,
for example, that it is in the nature of achievements to be ﬁnally
valuable, even though some achievements, because of their other
properties, are not ﬁnally valuable.8 For our purposes, so long as
cognitive achievements are the kind of thing that is ﬁnally valuable,
then that would probably sufﬁce to ensure the distinctive value of
knowledge. The thesis that knowledge is distinctively valuable
surely does not requires us to claim that all knowledge is distinctively
valuable. So long as it is in the nature of knowledge, qua cognitive
achievement, to be ﬁnally valuable, then that would almost certainly
sufﬁce.
In any case, we can set these issues to one side just now, since there
are surely good prima facie grounds for thinking that the claim that
achievements are distinctively valuable can be adequately motivated.
Moreover, the objection I want to raise to this validationist account
of epistemic value does not turn on any qualms about the value of
achievements but rather concerns the thesis that knowledge should
be understood as a cognitive achievement. As we will see, there are
good reasons for thinking that such a thesis is unsustainable.
non-instrumental value of the cognitive success is due to the relational prop-
erties of that success – i.e. due to how that success was achieved – it should
be clear that it is speciﬁcally ﬁnal value that is in play here. For more on the
distinction between intrinsic and ﬁnal value, see Rabinowicz &
Roennow-Rasmussen 1999; 2003. For more on the distinction as it applies
to the debate regarding epistemic value, see Pritchard 2007d, ß2.
8 Thanks to Mike Ridge for this suggestion.
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6.
Think again about the case of the archer described above. As before,
suppose that this archer selects a target at random and skilfully ﬁres at
that target, hitting the target as a result of her skill – that is, nothing
intervenes ‘betwixt’ ability and success such that the success is get-
tierized. We noted above that in such a case we would surely regard
the agent’s success as being because of her ability, and therefore
credit her with a genuine achievement.
Suppose that we add a further twist to this case, however, and sti-
pulate that had the agent chosen any other target on that range then
she would have missed because, unbeknownst to her, the targets in
question have a forceﬁeld in them which would have deﬂected the
arrows. Her success is thus lucky in the sense that she could have
very easily been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, does luck of this sort
undermine the agent’s achievement? I say not. Indeed, achievements
seem entirely compatible with luck of this sort, unlike the
Gettier-style luck which intervenes between ability and success.
After all, the agent really is hitting the target because of her ability,
and the luck in question – which we might term ‘environmental’
luck – does nothing to undermine this.
Insofar as we grant this point, however, then it creates problems for
the knowledge-as-achievement thesis. After all, we can construct an
example which is structurally analogous to the one just given but
where the environmental luck in question does undermine the
agent’s putative knowledge. The famous ‘barn facade’ example is
the best illustration of this point. Here we have an agent who sees a
barn in clear daylight and so forth and, using her reliable cognitive
abilities, forms a belief that what she sees is a barn. Moreover, this
belief is true and is not gettierized since she really is looking at
a barn (and thus nothing intervenes ‘betwixt’ belief and fact).
Nevertheless, her true belief is epistemically lucky – in the sense
that she could have easily been wrong – because unbeknownst to
her she is in barn facade county where nearly all the barn-shaped
objects are in fact fake barns which are indistinguishable to the
naked eye from the real thing. Does our agent know that what she
sees is a barn? Surely not, since her true belief is epistemically
lucky – she could very easily have been wrong. But is her true
belief, her cognitive success, a cognitive achievement? Well, if the
‘archer’ case just described is anything to go by, then it surely is.
After all, her true belief really is because of her cognitive ability, so
if that is what constitutes an achievement – and we have seen that
there is good reason to think that this is the right way to think
26
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about achievements – then we should regard the agent’s cognitive
success in this case as a cognitive achievement.
It thus seems that sometimes at least there is more to knowledge
than a mere cognitive achievement, and this means that the
knowledge-as-achievement thesis is false. In particular, it seems
that exhibiting a cognitive achievement does not sufﬁce to eliminate
all the knowledge-undermining kinds of epistemic luck, such as an
environmental epistemic luck.9
As far as I am aware, Greco is the only one to have engaged with an
objection of this sort – in print, at any rate – and at different points he
has made different responses to this objection to his view.10 Initially,
his line was to deny that the agent in the ‘barn facade’ case – and
thus, presumably, the agent in the ‘archer’ case also – had the
ability in question.11 Abilities are, after all, relative to environments,
so this line of argument is not entirely outlandish. Nevertheless, we
surely do not want the relativisation of abilities to environments to
have the result that abilities must be infallible, and this seems to be
the consequence of taking this line (for if the ability is not infallible
then there is bound to be a case that we can construct in which the
environment is such that the agent could very easily have been
wrong). Moreover, neither do we want abilities to be construed in
an unduly ﬁne-grained manner such that the relevant ability is lost
as soon as one enters the ‘deceptive’ environment in question.
A second line that Greco ( forthcomingb) pushed was simply to
insist that to say that a success was because of ability is thereby to
say that it is not due to luck. This is not a helpful suggestion,
however, since, as we have seen, while it is plausible to think that
the ‘because of’ eliminates the kind of Gettier-style luck that inter-
venes ‘betwixt’ success and ability, it is actually far from obvious –
and, indeed, counterintuitive – that it eliminates the very different
sort of environmental luck at issue in the cases just given. It seems,
then, that one cannot evade a problem like this through stipulation.
Ultimately, however, the line that Greco (2007b) has taken to this
problem has been to offer further theses regarding the function of
our concept of knowledge in order to explain why knowledge, qua
cognitive achievement, should be more resistant to luck than other
9 For more on this point as it applies to Sosa’s view in particular, see
Pritchard 2007c.
10 Note that I am not suggesting here that these responses are necess-
arily in tension with one another; indeed, there is every reason to think
that they are complementary.
11 See Greco forthcominga: ß5.
27
Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value
types of achievement. This move will deal with the problem, but it
does beg the question of whether a better way to deal with these
cases would be to abandon the knowledge-as-achievement thesis
rather than make exceptions for the case of knowledge that do not
apply elsewhere.12
7.
This problem is even more pressing once one notices that there are
cases of knowledge which, intuitively, do not involve cognitive
achievements, so that the separation between knowledge and cogni-
tive achievement goes in both directions. Consider the following
case, originally offered by Jennifer Lackey (2007), albeit to illustrate
a slightly different point.
Imagine our agent getting off the train in an unfamiliar town and
asking the ﬁrst person that she sees for directions. Suppose further
that the informant does indeed have ﬁrst-hand knowledge in this
regard and communicates this information to our agent who sub-
sequently heads off to her destination. We would naturally describe
such a case as one in which the informant’s knowledge was straight-
forwardly communicated to our agent; indeed, if we don’t allow
knowledge in cases like this then it seems that quite a lot of our puta-
tive testimony-based knowledge is called into question.
Crucially, however, it does not seem at all right to say that our agent’s
cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. Indeed, the right
thing to say seems to be that it is because of the informant’s cognitive
ability, or at least because of their combined cognitive efforts. But
that means that sometimes knowledge requires a lot less than a cogni-
tive achievement, contrary to the knowledge-as-achievement thesis.
It is important to be clear what the target of this objection is.
Lackey (2007) herself takes it to show that one can have knowledge
without it being of any credit to one that one has a true belief. But
examples like this surely do not license this rather radical conclusion.
After all, the agent in this case is exhibiting quite a lot of cognitive
ability if one examines the case a little more closely. Although she
asks the ﬁrst person she meets, she wouldn’t have asked just anyone
(or anything). She wouldn’t have asked a child, for example, or
someone who was clearly a tourist (and she certainly wouldn’t have
asked a lamppost or a passing dog). Moreover, she is presumably
12 I discuss Greco’s treatment of these issues further in Pritchard
forthcomingb. See also Kvanvig forthcoming.
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sensitive to potential defeaters. If the informant had given her direc-
tions which were obviously fake, for example, then we would have
expected her to have spotted this. Indeed, it is only if the agent is
exercising her cognitive abilities in this way that it seems permissible
to credit her with knowledge.
Nevertheless, the point remains that it is not because of her cogni-
tive abilities that she is cognitively successful – by anyone’s lights –
even though it is of some credit to her that she is cognitively
successful. But this is the point that we need to undermine, the
knowledge-as-achievement thesis, since it demonstrates that there is
sometimes less to knowledge than a cognitive achievement.
8.
If this were the only problem facing the knowledge-as-achievement
thesis, then one might reasonably take the heroic route of denying
the intuition in this case and insisting that it is because of the
agent’s cognitive abilities that she is cognitively successful. But
once one combines this objection with that noted earlier – which
demonstrates that there is sometimes more to knowledge than a
cognitive achievement – then this points towards a different way of
understanding knowledge.
Indeed, I would argue that what cases like this show is that the
modest virtue epistemic proposal is preferable to the robust virtue
epistemic proposal. After all, on this view the ability condition on
knowledge is not ‘beefed up’ to the extent that knowledge demands
a cognitive achievement, and so one does not get the problem posed
by Lackey-style cases. Moreover, since there is also the anti-luck con-
dition on knowledge, expressed in terms of a safety principle, then
cases like the barn facade case, in which there is a cognitive achieve-
ment but also knowledge-undermining epistemic luck, are also dealt
with.
Furthermore, notice that such a view is not necessarily in conﬂict
with the story told by robust virtue epistemologists regarding the
distinctive value of knowledge. At the very least, the modest virtue
epistemic proposal is consistent with a revisionist response to the
problem of epistemic value which says that it is not knowledge,
strictly speaking, which is distinctively valuable, but rather cognitive
achievement, an epistemic standing which (it seems) only comes
apart from knowledge in peripheral cases.
But the modest virtue epistemic proposal might also be compatible
with a validationist response to the problem of epistemic value as well.
29
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If it is indeed true that knowledge and cognitive achievement only
come apart in peripheral cases – and whether one ﬁnds this claim
plausible may depend, in part, on one’s wider epistemological
theory – then one could argue that it is of the nature of knowledge to
be distinctively valuable, even though it isn’t always distinctively valu-
able. Perhaps, for example, all paradigm cases of knowledge are also
cases of cognitive achievement.13 If that’s right, then there might be
scope to argue that knowledge is distinctively valuable after all.
9.
Let us put this tentative conclusion to one side for now, however,
because I want to consider a second account of epistemic value which,
as we will see, is relevant in this regard. This is the proposal that
understanding is a distinctively valuable epistemic standing, a thesis
which is often supplemented with the further claim that it is the only
distinctively valuable epistemic standing, thereby making the view a
form of revisionism.
It is easy to see the attraction of such a view, in that understanding
does seem to be particularly valuable to us. More speciﬁcally, insofar
as knowledge and understanding do indeed come apart, then under-
standing seems to be preferable to knowledge. As we might be
tempted to put the point, we would surely rather understand than
merely know.
Before we can evaluate a claim of this sort, however, we need to be a
little clearer about what we are talking about. One problem that afﬂicts
any direct comparison between knowledge and understanding is that
knowledge (of the propositional sort that we are concerned with at
any rate) is concerned with propositions, whereas understanding
usually isn’t, at least not directly. Interestingly, where understanding
is of a proposition, it does seem to be pretty much synonymous with
knows. On discovering that my train has been cancelled, I may well
say to the person at the ticket ofﬁce that I understand that the train
is cancelled in such a way that I could just as well have used ‘know’
without any loss. If anything, using ‘understand’ in this way seems
to weaken the effect of the assertion. If I say to you that I understand
that you are angry with me then this has the positive effect of being a
little less confrontational than a straight assertion that I know that
you are angry with me (for one thing, it gives you the option to deny
this without obviously accusing me of any ignorance).
13 I am grateful to Chris Hookway for this suggestion.
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Most uses of ‘understands’ are not like this, however. I want to take
the paradigm usage of ‘understands’ to be in a statement like ‘I under-
stand why such-and-such is the case’. Notice that this usage is very
different from a more holistic usage which applies to subject
matters, as in ‘I understand quantum physics’, or even ‘I understand
my wife’. I think the holistic usage of ‘understands’ is related to the
non-holistic, or atomistic, usage that is our focus, but the former
raises problems of its own that we’ve not the space to cover here
(though we will ﬂag some of these problems as we go along).14
Regarding understanding-why – henceforth just ‘understanding’ –
there are, interestingly, two standard views – a standard view within
epistemology and a standard view outside of epistemology (particularly
in the philosophy of science). The standard view within epistemology
is that understanding is distinctively valuable but that it is not a species
of knowledge.One ﬁnds a view of this sort in thework of such ﬁgures as
Kvanvig (2003), Zagzebski (2001), Wayne Riggs ( forthcoming) and
Catherine Elgin (1996; 2004; forthcoming), and we will examine the
motivation for such a thesis in a moment.
In contrast, outside of epistemology the consensus is clearly that
understanding is a species of knowledge. In particular, most philoso-
phers of science who have expressed an opinion on this matter have
endorsed the claim that understanding why such-and-such is the
case is equivalent to knowing why such-and-such is the case, where
this is in turn equivalent to knowing that such-and-such is the case
because of such-and-such. So, for example, my understanding of
why my house burned down is equivalent to my knowing why
my house burned down, where this in turn is tantamount to my
knowing that my house burned down because (say) of faulty
wiring. One ﬁnds a view of this sort – expressed in varying levels
of explicitness – in the work of such ﬁgures as Peter Achinstein
(1983), Wesley Salmon (1989), Philip Kitcher (2002), James
Woodward (2003) and Peter Lipton (2004).15
14 For more on holistic and non-holistic conceptions of understanding,
see B. Brogaard 2007.
15 Consider the following remark made by Lipton 2004: 30 and quoted
in S. Grimm 2006: 1, for example: “Understanding is not some sort of
super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes”.
The natural way to read this passage is as suggesting that understanding
why one’s house burned down is just knowing why it burned down – i.e.
knowing that it burned down because of (say) faulty wiring. I am grateful
to Grimm (2006) for alerting me to some of these references.
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As we will see, I want to claim that both of these conceptions of
understanding are wrong, at least strictly speaking, and that once
we get clear on the relationship between understanding and knowl-
edge we can make some progress towards dealing with the problem
of epistemic value.
10.
Let us look ﬁrst at some the accounts of understanding offered by
epistemologists. One guiding theme in this discussion is that under-
standing is construed along epistemically internalist lines. One
extreme example of this can be found in the work of Zagzebski
(2001). She argues, amongst other things, that understanding is,
unlike knowledge, “transparent” in the sense that there is no gap
between seeming to understand and understanding. Relatedly, she
also claims that understanding is, unlike knowledge, non-factive, in
that even if one’s relevant beliefs were false, one’s understanding
could be unaffected.16 Finally, she holds that understanding, unlike
knowledge, is immune to epistemic luck, in that if one’s understand-
ing is subject to such luck it will not thereby be undermined.
Of these claims, the ﬁrst is clearly the most radical and also,
I venture, the one that is most obviously false. To construe under-
standing in this way seems to reduce it to nothing more than some
sort of minimal consistency in one’s beliefs, something which
might well be transparent to one (though I’m actually doubtful
of this). Understanding clearly involves much more than this,
however. To see this, let us focus on the non-factivity claim that
Zagzebski makes. This claim is also, I will argue, false, but if under-
standing does imply factivity in the relevant sense, then it will be easy
to show that understanding is not transparent in the way that
Zagzebski suggests.
To illustrate this point, consider my understanding of why my
house has burned down. Let us grant the plausible assumption that
this understanding involves a coherent set of relevant beliefs concern-
ing, for example, the faulty wiring inmy house. But now suppose that
these beliefs are mistaken and that, in particular, there was no faulty
16 Riggs ( forthcoming) and Elgin ( forthcoming; cf. Elgin 1996; 2004)
also argue that understanding is not factive, although their claim is ulti-
mately much weaker than Zagzebski’s since it in effect only applies
to certain conceptions of understanding (and not, in particular, to the
non-holistic conception of understanding in play here).
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wiring in my house and so it played no part in the ﬁre. Would we still
say that I understand why my house burned down? I think not. For
sure, I thought I understood – indeed, it could well be that I reason-
ably thought that I understood – but the fact remains that I did not
understand. Once one grants that understanding is factive in this
way, however, then the transparency claim starts to look equally
suspect, since if understanding is factive then it clearly cannot be
transparent as the factivity of understanding would require there to
be a distinction between thinking that certain facts obtain and their
obtaining, contrary to what the transparency thesis demands.
So the transparency and non-factivity claims that Zagzebski offers
are false. It is difﬁcult to diagnose why Zagzebski made this mistake.
Part of the reason may be that there is a failure to be clear about
the type of understanding under consideration. After all, when it
comes to the kind of holistic understanding that applies to a subject
matter, this plausibly is compatible with at least some false beliefs
about that subject matter, but this sort of understanding is precisely
not the sort at issue. Moreover, it would seem that the analogue of
Zagzebski’s non-factivity claim as regards understanding when it
comes to holistic understanding would be that such understanding
can be possessed even though one has no relevant true beliefs, and
that is surely implausible.17
More generally, however, I think the diagnosis for where
Zagzebski’s conception of understanding goes awry lies in overstating
the internalist aspect of understanding. Understanding clearly is very
amenable to an account along internalist lines, in the sense that it is
hard to make sense of how an agent could possess understanding
and yet lack good reﬂectively accessible grounds in support of that
understanding. Understanding thus cannot be ‘opaque’ to the
subject in the way that knowledge, by externalist lights at least, can
sometimes be. Granting this, however, does not entail that one
should regard understanding as non-factive, much less transparent.
17 It should be noted that there are some good arguments offered by
Elgin ( forthcoming) in this respect regarding the growth of understanding
within false scientiﬁc theories, and the use of idealisations in scientiﬁc think-
ing, which might seem to suggest a conception of holistic understanding
which is entirely non-factive. It would take us too far aﬁeld to consider
these arguments, however, and Zagzebski clearly doesn’t have consider-
ations like this in mind when she offers her conception of (non-holistic)
understanding. For my own part, I think that even here we should say
that genuine understanding entails a system of beliefs which is broadly
correct, at least as regards the beliefs that are fundamental to that system.
For more on this point, see Pritchard 2007b: ß5.
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11.
With this in mind, let us consider a second account of understanding
in the epistemological literature – due to Kvanvig (2003) – which
does not succumb to the mistakes made by Zagzebski’s account.
Zagzebski holds that both knowledge and understanding are distinc-
tively valuable. In contrast, Kvanvig maintains that it is only under-
standing that is distinctively valuable, where understanding is
distinct from knowing.
Unlike Zagzebski, Kvanvig does not hold that understanding is
transparent or non-factive. He does, however, treat the notion
along internalist lines which, as we’ve just noted, is entirely proper.
The way in which he distinguishes knowledge from understanding
is primarily through two further claims. The ﬁrst is that understand-
ing, unlike knowledge, admits of degrees. The second is that under-
standing, unlike knowledge, is immune to epistemic luck, a thesis
which we saw Zagzebski putting forward a moment ago.
The import of the ﬁrst claim is, I think, moot. After all, even if this
is true, it needn’t follow that there are cases of knowledge which aren’t
corresponding cases of understanding, or that there are cases of under-
standingwhich aren’t corresponding cases of knowledge. Theweight of
the distinction between knowledge and understanding on this view
thus falls on the second claim, which merits further consideration.
This thesis is meant to reﬂect, I think, the internalist dimension to
understanding. That is, the idea is that just as one’s justiﬁcation,
internalistically conceived, is not undermined by epistemic luck
( just the sufﬁciency of that justiﬁcation, with true belief, for knowl-
edge), so one’s understanding is not undermined either. Closer
inspection of this claim reveals that the relationship between under-
standing and epistemic luck is, however, more complex than
Kvanvig and Zagzebski suppose.
The example that Kvanvig offers to illustrate this claim is that of
someone who, by reading a book on the Comanche tribe, gains a
series of beliefs about the Comanche and, thereby, an “historical
understanding of the Comanche dominance of the southern plains
of North America from the late seventeenth until the late nineteenth
century” (Kvanvig 2003: 197).18 We are told that the relevant class of
beliefs contains no falsehood, and that the agent can answer all the
18 Understanding of this very general claim might start to look danger-
ously close to holistic understanding of a subject matter, rather than the non-
holistic understanding that we are interested in here. In what follows, I will
set this concern to one side and simply read it as non-holistic understanding.
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relevant questions correctly in this regard (thereby illustrating that
the putative knowledge possessed is not ‘opaque’). However,
Kvanvig argues that although in such a case one would expect
the agent to have knowledge of the relevant beliefs, this is not
essential – it could well be, as he points out, that the true beliefs in
question have been ‘gettierized’, perhaps because the information
that the agent has is only “accidentally true” (ibid.).
I think that a case like this is crucially ambiguous, but we can get a
better handle on what is going on here by taking a simpler case and
then returning to consider this more complex example in the light
of our intuitions as regards the simpler case.
Consider the example of understanding why one’s house burned
down. Suppose ﬁrst that we have a standard Gettier-style case in
which something intervenes ‘betwixt’ belief and fact. For example,
imagine that, upon ﬁnding one’s house in ﬂames, one approaches
someone who looks as if she is the ﬁre ofﬁcer in charge and asks her
what the reason for the ﬁre is. Suppose one is told by this person
that the reason why one’s house is burning is faulty wiring, and
this coheres with one’s wider set of beliefs. But suppose now that
the person one asked in this regard is not in fact the ﬁre ofﬁcer in
charge but instead someone who is simply dressed in a ﬁre ofﬁcer’s
uniform and who is on her way to a fancy dress party. Still, one did
indeed gain a true belief in this regard. So, even though the epistemic
luck in question prevents one from having knowledge of the relevant
propositions, does one lose one’s understanding? Seemingly, it does,
for ask yourself the question now of whether you understand why
your house burnt down. Surely the answer to this question is a
straightforward ‘no’. One cannot gain an understanding of why
one’s house burnt down by consulting someone who, unbeknownst
to you, is not the ﬁre ofﬁcer but instead someone in fancy dress.
12.
So does this mean that Kvanvig is just wrong in thinking that under-
standing is immune to epistemic luck? Not entirely since, as we have
noted above, there is a kind of epistemic luck which is knowledge-
undermining but which is not of the sort that appears in
Gettier-style cases which intervenes ‘betwixt’ belief and fact. With
this in mind, consider a variant on the case just described in which it
is not Gettier-style epistemic luck that is at issue but rather the sort
of ‘environmental’ epistemic luck at issue in the barn facade case.
For example, imagine that the apparent ﬁre ofﬁcer that one asks
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about the cause of the ﬁre is indeed the ﬁre ofﬁcer, but that one could
nevertheless have been easily wrong because there were other people in
the vicinity dressed as ﬁre ofﬁcers – all going to the same fancy dress
party, say – who one could very easily have asked and who would
have given one a false answer (while failing to indicate that they were
not real ﬁre ofﬁcers).
In such a case, as we saw above, one’s cognitive success would be
because of one’s cognitive abilities, and so would constitute a cogni-
tive achievement, and yet the epistemic luck at issue would prevent it
from counting as knowledge. The critical question for us, however, is
whether it is a case of understanding. I want to argue that it is, and
thus that Kvanvig is right on at least this score: ‘environmental’ epis-
temic luck, unlike Gettier-style epistemic luck, is compatible with
possessing understanding. After all, the agent concerned has all the
true beliefs required for understanding why his house burned
down, and also acquired this understanding in the right fashion. It
is thus hard to see why the mere presence of ‘environmental’ episte-
mic luck should deprive the agent of understanding.
With this distinction between two types of epistemic luck in mind –
one, the Gettier-style epistemic luck, which is inconsistent with
understanding and a second, the ‘environmental’ epistemic luck,
which is consistent with understanding – we can return to evaluate
Kvanvig’s ‘Comanche’ case. Whether or not the agent retains her
understanding in this case will depend on the type of epistemic luck
at issue.
So, for example, suppose that the agent forms her beliefs about
the Comanches by reading an apparently scholarly book which is
in fact nothing of the sort. Let us say, for instance, that the author
of this book simply took lots of rumours and unchecked stories
about the Comanche and presented them, along with some inven-
tive guesswork, as established fact. But suppose further that
despite this lack of attention to scholarship, the author did get
matters entirely right. This would thus be a Gettier-style case in
which our agent gains lots of true beliefs about the Comanches:
she has good reason to think that her beliefs about the Comanche
are true, and they are true, but it is just a matter of luck that they
are true given that the source of these beliefs is so unreliable. Can
one gain an understanding of the Comanche tribe in this way? In
particular, can one gain an historical understanding of why the
Comanche were so dominant in the southern plains of North
America from the late seventeenth until the late nineteenth
century in this fashion? I want to suggest that one cannot, any
more than one can gain an understanding of why one’s house
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burnt down by gaining a true belief about what caused the ﬁre from
someone pretending to be a ﬁre ofﬁcer.
Matters are different, however, if we redescribe the case as a form
of environmental epistemic luck, rather than as Gettier-style epis-
temic luck. Suppose, for example, that the book that the agent con-
sults is indeed appropriately scholarly – and thus reliable – when it
comes to this subject-matter, and that the agent accordingly gains
lots of true beliefs about the Comanche. Nevertheless, the luck
enters the picture because of how all the other books on this
topic – which are also superﬁcially just as a scholarly – are very
unreliable, and one could very easily have found out what one
did by consulting one of these books. Does epistemic luck of this
sort undermine one’s understanding in the way that it would
undermine one’s knowledge? I don’t think that it does, since one
did indeed ﬁnd out the relevant facts in the right kind of way.
Just as one can gain an understanding of why one’s house burnt
down by speaking to the ﬁre ofﬁcer – even though one could just
have easily been misled by someone who isn’t the ﬁre ofﬁcer – so
one can gain an understanding of the Comanche by reading a
reliable book even though one could have very easily consulted
an unreliable book.19
13.
So while Kvanvig and others are right to think that understanding is
compatible with a certain type of knowledge-undermining epistemic
luck, they are wrong to think that it is compatible with all types of
knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. Their mistake, it seems, is
to fail to distinguish between two crucial ways in which epistemic
luck can be knowledge-undermining. That understanding is compati-
ble with one type of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck sufﬁces,
however, to show that knowledge is distinct from understanding,
since it entails that one can have understanding without the associated
knowledge.
19 While noticing that Kvanvig’s claim that understanding is compati-
ble with epistemic luck is not quite right, Grimm 2006 fails to recognise that
the mistake here is simply to equate environmental epistemic luck with
Gettier-style epistemic luck. As a result, he concludes that understanding
is just as incompatible with epistemic luck as knowledge is, and thus that
knowledge is a species of understanding after all.
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One consequence of this is that the standard view of understanding
outside of epistemology, such that understanding is a species of
knowledge, is false. Indeed, this is not the only respect in which
this conception of understanding is mistaken. Recall that on this con-
ception of understanding, to understand why such-and-such is the
case is equivalent to knowing why such-and-such is the case, which
is in turn equivalent to knowing that such-and-such is the case
because of such-and-such. As we have seen, however, the problem
of environmental epistemic luck illustrates that I can understand
why my house burned down even while failing to know why it
burned down (indeed, even while failing to know that it burned
down because of faulty wiring).
There is also a second respect in which this conception of under-
standing is mistaken, since it is possible to know why one’s house
has burned down (and indeed know that it burned down because
of faulty wiring), even though one does not understand why one’s
house burned down. We can illustrate this point via a
Lackey-style example. Suppose that I understand why my house
burned down, know why it burned down, and also know that it
burned down because of faulty wiring. Imagine further that my
young son asks me why his house burned down and I tell him. He
has no conception of how faulty wiring might cause a ﬁre, so we
could hardly imagine that merely knowing this much sufﬁces to
afford him understanding of why his house burned down.
Nevertheless, he surely does know that his house burned down
because of faulty wiring, and thus also knows why his house
burned down. Indeed, we can imagine a teacher asking my son if
he knows why his house burned down and him telling the teacher
the reason. If asked by a second teacher if my son knew why his
house burned down, we could then imagine the ﬁrst teacher
saying that he did. So, it seems, one can not only have understanding
without the corresponding knowledge, but also knowledge without
the corresponding understanding.20
14.
Just as the Lackey-style case offered earlier demonstrated that some-
times one might have knowledge without a cognitive achievement,
the same moral can be drawn here. My son might know why his
20 For more on the relationship between understanding and knowing-
why, see Pritchard forthcomingc.
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house burned down, but this knowledge does not constitute a cogni-
tive achievement on his part because of how he is unable to take
appropriate credit for the truth of his belief. Interestingly, however,
we have just seen that while knowledge and cognitive achievement
come apart on this score, understanding and cognitive achievement
do not. My son’s knowledge does not constitute a cognitive achieve-
ment, but then neither does it constitute genuine understanding on
his part either.21
Indeed, we have good reason to think that all understanding
involves cognitive achievement. Recall that the moral of the barn
facade case described earlier was that one could exhibit a cognitive
achievement and yet lack knowledge, because of how knowledge,
unlike cognitive achievement, is incompatible with environmental
epistemic luck. The same applies to understanding. When one
couples this observation with the fact that the cases in which an
agent has knowledge while not exhibiting a cognitive achievement
are cases in which the agent lacks the relevant understanding, then
one can see that there is a strong prima facie case for thinking that
all understanding involves a cognitive achievement.
Indeed, I think this thesis is highly plausible. Its plausibility relates
to the fact that understanding seems to be essentially an epistemically
internalist notion, in the sense that if one has understanding then it
should not be opaque to one that one has this understanding – in
particular, one should have good reﬂectively accessible grounds in
support of the relevant beliefs that undergird that understanding.
But given that this is a requirement of understanding, it is unsurpris-
ing that one can construct a Lackey-style case in which an agent has
knowledge but not understanding, since such cases work precisely
by using examples of agents who, while having knowledge, lack
good reﬂectively accessible grounds in favour of their beliefs.
That understanding is both factive and resistant to Gettier-style
epistemic luck also demonstrates, however, that we should be wary
of construing understanding along purely internalist lines. One’s
reﬂectively accessible grounds in favour of one’s belief might well
survive the falsity of what one believes and also be compatible with
Gettier-style luck, but as we have seen, the same is not true of under-
standing. Just as genuine cognitive achievements do not depend
exclusively on the cognitive efforts of the agent, but also on the rel-
evant cognitive success and the right connection obtaining between
21 I argue in Pritchard forthcominga that this point has some important
implications for the epistemology of testimony.
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cognitive ability and cognitive success, so genuine understanding
makes the same ‘external’ demands.
15.
So where does all this leave us as regards the problem of epistemic
value? Recall that we noted above that the robust virtue epistemic
approach to this problem did not succeed, in that there was no
straightforward way of showing that the distinctive value of cognitive
achievements carried over to knowledge. At most, this approach
demonstrated that it is cognitive achievements that are distinctively
valuable but, since one could exhibit a cognitive achievement while
lacking knowledge, and know while failing to exhibit a cognitive
achievement, this thesis, unless suitably supplemented with further
argument at any rate, did not translate into the claim that knowledge
is distinctively valuable. Indeed, as matters stand, what we end up
with is a kind of revisionism rather than a form of validationism,
in that it is actually cognitive achievements that are distinctively
valuable, rather than knowledge.
We have noted here that understanding also comes apart from
knowledge, in the sense that one can have understanding while
lacking the corresponding knowledge and have knowledge while
lacking the corresponding understanding. Nevertheless, if cognitive
achievements are the kind of thing which are distinctively valuable,
then – given that we have seen that there are strong grounds for sup-
posing that understanding is a kind of cognitive achievement – we
have a straightforward explanation of why understanding is distinc-
tively valuable.
At the very least, then, we have a form of revisionism available to
us which could explain why understanding, rather than knowledge,
is distinctively valuable. Interestingly for our purposes, however, a
form of revisionism which appeals to the special value of understand-
ing is, I think, more appealing than a form of revisionism which
appeals to an epistemic standing which is clearly a ‘lesser’ epistemic
standing when assessed relative to knowledge, such as justiﬁed true
belief. For while one can have understanding while lacking knowl-
edge, it should be clear that understanding requires an intellectual
sophistication that is not necessarily demanded by knowledge. One
can imagine, for example, an agent knowing a great deal while
having very little understanding of anything, but it is hard to
imagine the converse. If understanding is a cognitive achievement,
something that can only fall short of knowledge when environmental
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epistemic luck is present, then we have a straightforward explanation
for this intuition. Knowledge may or may not be distinctively valu-
able, but understanding certainly is, and given the features of under-
standing that we have noted, this claim, while in itself revisionist, is
certainly highly plausible.22
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